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1. (1b) Sino-Soviet Friendship:

Kunming announced (Jan. 24) that the Huaning, Yunnan, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association celebrated the 29th anniversary of Lenin's death, with speakers praising Lenin's "concern for China" and asking for a stronger Sino-Soviet friendship. Hengehow reported (Jan. 20) that local theaters would show films on Lenin for one week. Kunming said (Jan. 22) that Peking and Tientsin newspapers carried articles about Lenin.

Peking (Jan. 22) broadcast a dispatch by Chen Huai from the Harbin Jute Mill during SSF Month praising Soviet aid in constructing and operating the plant. Tsinan announced (Jan. 19) that the Tsingtae SSFA would train 200 Russian translators, in keeping with SSFA policy to train Russian-language personnel in all offices. Hofei stated (Jan. 22) that the Anhwei Education Department would conduct a Russian-language night school.

2. (2c) Russian Superiority:

Chengte reported (Jan. 20) that 2,000 Jehol cadres had completed a study of Malenkov's 19th Party Congress report, planned to improve Party work and industrialize China by smulating Russian methods, and were told to "look upon Malenkov's principles as State law." Dairen announced (Jan. 22) that all local schools had started studying Malenkov's report for political indoctrination.

Peking stated in numeral code (Jan. 19) that the Northeast People's Theater had successfully produced the Soviet drama "Dawn Over Moscow," and that Chinese wording had been added to many Soviet movies for local showing.

Peking announced (Jan. 21) that the Northeast No. 1 Machine Tool Factory had made a Soviet-type precision laths "through the combined efforts of Soviet experts and Chinese technicians." Peking asserted in numeral code (Jan. 23) that Taiyuan engineers had saved large sums through the Soviet Kershnov Pile Construction Method. A Northeast machine tool factory made a 5-ton steam hammer from a smaller Russian blueprint after an inferior American blueprint was rejected. Mukden announced (Jan. 21) that Fushun Mining Administration designers were studying Soviet methods to assure success of Projects 201 and 202.

3. (2a) War Burdens:

Wuhan announced (Jan. 20) that the Kiangsi Resist-America, Aid-Korea Committee had directed cadres to arouse people to the importance of the 2-year struggle by the Chinese People's Volunteers. Wuhsi said (Jan. 21) that the Kiangsu Committee had ordered cadres to step up RAAK propaganda.

Wuhan announced (Jan. 22) that the 4th Field Army had designated Jan. 26 to Feb. 28 as a month to promote propaganda on the patriotism of soldiers, and the soldicitude of the soldiers for the welfare of the masses. Shanghai stated (Jan. 25) that a similar drive was launched by the 3d Army.

Hangchow (Jan. 20) told of a Yungchia Hsien, Chekiang, meeting when peasants admitted they had not done all they could to promote preferential treatment. Peking reported (Jan. 23) that an Interior Ministry directive had increased grants to revolutionary martyrs and Armymen's dependents. Canton announced (Jan. 22) that "preferential treatment models" were being selected for the spring festival. Wuhan (Jan. 20), Chungking (Jan. 24), and Shanghai (Jan. 25) reported new efforts to step up preferential treatment.

Peking reported in numeral code (Jan. 24) that the CPV Political Section, on the 5th anniversary of the Korean People's Army, instructed the Chinese to "master the military techniques and combat experience of the KPA to strengthen the unity of Chinese and Korean units."

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4. (2a) War Propaganda:

Peking announced (Jan. 21) that Chou En-lai had formally protested an attack over Antung Jan. 12, when an invading American plane was shot down. Declaring the "brutal act committed by the U.S. Air Force will never be tolerated by the Chinese people," Chou added that "the preliminary steps taken by the United States to enlarge the war in Korea have become a serious menace to the peace of Asia and the Far East." Kunming (Jan. 23) asserted that American spies dropped over North Korea "to organize rear area guerrilla units" and collect military information had been captured.

Peking said (Jan. 24) that South Koreans were more miserable under the Americans and Syngman Rhee than under the Japanese. Peking in numeral code (Jan. 20) declared that London sentiment against continuing the war in Korea was growing. Peking said (Jan. 20) that "oppressive measures" were being used to stop U.S. desertions, and (Jan. 24) quoted TASS dispatches on offering of monetary rewards for information on deserters.

5. (2c) Trade and Production Problems:

Hangehow reported (Jan. 20) that State trading company cadres had been ordered to "overcome their laxity" and assist private traders to supply needed goods for the spring festival. Wuhsi told (Jan. 21) of a Nanking power plant workers' meeting, when older workers "showed little interest in the meeting and criticized the efficiency of the administration" until they were influenced by the younger

Peking said in numeral code (Jan. 19) that Husinan Mining Administration collieries failed to fill their quotas in recent years. Hofei (Jan. 20) quoted the Husinan Miners Union as saying the administration "paid too much attention to production and not enough to safety."

6. (3a) Russianization Moves:

Hangchow stated (Jan. 20) that local high school teachers would attent courses in political indoctrination. Peking reported in numeral code (Jan. 23) that 18,570 propaganda cadres were at work in Chungking establishments. Mukden said (Jan. 21) that 219,600 Party members in the Northeast who completed training courses last year were streamlining the Party organization.

Peking (Jan. 20) described the persecution in Shensi of "Mr. Chang" for reporting errors of cadres. The incident focused attention on the handling of informers' reports, and the need for checks by higher offices. Wuhsi (Jan. 20) quoted from a Shanghai CHIEH FANG JIH PAO article on expulsion from the Party of Huang I-feng, former East China communications chief, for improper treatment of informers. Wuhsi added (Jan. 21) that Kiangsu cadres had failed to act upon 8,000 letters, in some cases punishing the informers. Wuhu reported (Jan. 22) an Anhwei Party Committee resolution supporting Huang's expulsion.

7. (3a) Basic Construction:

Peking said in numeral code (Jan. 19) that 30 Northwest factories had been reorganized into five units to provide basic construction needs. Peking added (Jan. 23) that the China Coal Mining Administration had given priority to production of coke for industrial rather than civilian use.

Peking complained in numeral code (Jan. 19) that 90 percent of Peking's construction projects had not yet been designed, with work retarded because of errors in estimates. Mukden (Jan. 24) quoted the TUNG PEI JIH PAO: "Erroneous thoughts and improper attitudes toward basic construction should be criticized and corrected, and selfishness among cadres in striving for self-aggrandizement must be eliminated."

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8. (3a) Bureaucratic Weaknesses:

Peking reported in numeral code (Jan. 20) that confusion existed in Chu Hsien, Shantung, because cadres were involved in too many positions, assignments, meetings, and inspections. A new office was opened for every assignment, with one mutual aid team filling out 225 forms, and records kept on the daily kill of flies and mosquitces. Peasants called cadres "number counters and meeting attenders."

Peking in numeral code (Jan. 23) pointed out that a Hunan model production cadre spent $2\frac{1}{2}$ months on production, the rest in travel, meetings, and inspections.

Antung said (Jan. 22) that at the Shiven Colliery, Tunghua, mining administration cadres exhibited poor propaganda and leadership, and lack of technical knowledge. The colliery reached only 85 percent of its quota.

9. (3a) Counterrevolutionary Indications:

Hangchow (Jan. 20) reported that Chekiang militiamen, paying greater attention to duty following indoctrination, had captured one counterrevolutionary and forced a village teacher with reactionary thoughts to undergo labor reform.

Foochow stated (Jan. 20) that after undergoing political indoctrination, Fukien militiamen were patrolling and posting sentries along the coast with increased vigilance. Chungking announced (Jan. 22) that the Szechwan Nationalities Committee passed a resolution calling for counterrevolutionary suppression.

10. (3a) Judicial Reform:

Wuhan announced (Jan. 23) that five teams had been dispatched to Kwangtung to carry out judicial reforms. Kunming asserted (Jan. 22) that judicial reform had been completed locally, with "old legal concepts wiped out" and cadres engaged in the "construction stage."

11. (3e) Agricultural Remolding:

Mukden said (Jan. 23) that 1,200 experimental cooperatives in the Northeast last year produced higher yields than ordinary farmers.

Chungking complained (Jan. 21) that in Tzuchung Hsien, Szechwan, mutual aid teams were poorly organized; private equipment confiscated for public use; farmers forced to join mutual aid teams to get loans; and farmers led to think that mutual aid teams meant nothing but the tearing down of middle farmers. Five cooperatives had reduced production last year, and 15 abandoned their mutual aid teams.

12. (4) American Aggression:

Peking asserted in numeral code (Jan. 19) that America was using POW's to test new weapons, and added (Jan. 25) that freedom of speech had been destroyed in America because of the "fascist warmongering atmosphere."

Peking asserted in numeral code (Jan. 24) that Americans had converted Hokkaido into a military base, and (Jan. 25) accused Americans of creating dissension among Japanese labor groups to prevent consolidation of the working class. Peking stated in numeral code (Jan. 22) that complaints by members of espionage agents' families in Japan revealed that America had sent secret agents to Sakhalin and Chishima in September.

Peking said in numeral code (Jan. 20) that American capitalists were trying to wrest the Egyptian market from Britain, and added (Jan. 21) that under American direction the Japanese were trying to destroy British control of Southeast Asian resources.

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SUMMARY

Despite deemphasis of Sino-Soviet friendship and the debt to Russia, new steps toward Russification are noted. For instance, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association takes over the task of promoting the Russian language; study of Soviet documents is accelerated, with cadres warned to consider Malenkov's principles "as State law"; and efforts to tighten the Party grip and centralize Governmental control continue.

Imminence of a new Resist-America, Aid-Korea drive still is apparent, but whether as another money-raising campaign or in some new form is not certain. Preferential treatment receives new stress, and efforts are made to whip up enthusiasm for the Army, partly through convincing the people of Army "solicitude" for their welfare. War propagands continues to stress American aggression as well as American weaknesses that guarantee a Communist victory. However, special praise for the Korean People's Army and advice to the Chinese to "master the military techniques and combat experience of the KPA to strengthen the unity of Chinese and Korean units" might indicate weaknesses in the Communist ranks and new subservience to the KPA's Russian teachers.

There is ample evidence of difficulties linked with the basic construction campaign. New priorities consign coke to "industrial rather than civilian use," but as practically all coke in China is used by industry already, this probably means private concerns will be denied supplies altogether, thus limiting consumer goods production. Government personnel apparently still refuse wholehearted support to the basic construction program, while resistance from old workers is admitted, though the fully indoctrinated new workers are credited with whipping them into line. New emphasis on training and indoctrination of militiamen, continued stress on tender treatment for Party informers, and punishment for teachers, all suggest that fear of active resistance to the regime still is great.

Weaknesses of the top-heavy bureaucracy being built are illustrated by complaints that propaganda activities of production models keep them from producing, and by admission that the exaggerated zeal of loyal cadres in some localities arouses only amused contempt among the peasants.

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